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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
year and a day. 5 The court here bases its conclusion on the fact
that the statute 16 contains no mention of the year and a day rule
of common law, and therefore, the defendant is denied the presumption which was his right at common law. 1"
J. A. R.,

CRIMINAL
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LAW-2ND

OFFENDER.-Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery in second degree.
On a prior offense he had pleaded non zndt to an action brought by
the state of New Jersey. He was charged and convicted as a second
offender. On motion by defendant, after sentence and beginning of
prison term, to withdraw plea of guilty of felony because of alleged
promise that court would permit defendant to plead to misdemeanor
if certain prior offenses proved to be felonies, held, properly denied,
where judge before imposing sentence on guilty plea stated that he
had made no such promise. People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 191
N. E. 859 (1934).
The plea of non vult was a common law plea that had the same
subsequent consequences in a criminal court as a plea of guilty.'
When judgment has been entered on it, the record is competent evidence of the conviction. 2

Thus, the plea of non vult followed by a

judgment is a previous conviction of crime.5 A prisoner in a criminal case is not entitled as a matter of right to withdraw a plea duly
made in order that he may file another plea; 4 the matter is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. 5 Where it is plain that substantial justice will not be promoted, or the substantial rights of the
defendant prejudiced, the application for leave to withdraw the plea
should be denied. 6 In the absence of any controlling fact rendering
7
it unjust to do so the court may refuse to withdraw a plea of guilty.

However this discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of life
"Instant case at 108; People v. Legeri,

supra note 11.

" Supra note 7.

"Instant case.
'State v. Herlihy, 102 Me. 310, 66 At1. 643 (1906); State v. Sidell, 103
Me. 144, 68 Atl. 643 (1907). It is pleaded to minimize the duration of the
sentence. Instant case.
2 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 248 Pa. 530, 94 Atl. 233 (1915).
'

Instant case.

Farley v. State, 23 Ga. App. 151, 97 S. E. 870 (1919) ; State v. Branner,
149 N. C. 559, 63 S. E. 169 (1908).
' State v. Olsen, 115 Minn. 153, 131 N. W. 1084 (1911) ; State v. Strum,
115 Minn. 533, 131 N. W. 1086 (1911).
' State v. Gregg, 123 La. 610, 49 So. 211 (1909); State v. Stephenson,
67 W. Va. 553, 68 S. E. 286 (1910).
'Supra note 6.

RECENT DECISIONS
and liberty.8 Therefore the court ordinarily will permit a plea of
guilty to be withdrawn if it fairly appears that the prisoner was in
ignorance of his rights or was influenced unduly or improperly either
by hope or by fear in the making of it.9 Where the plea of guilty is
entered under belief, induced by the judge, that sentence less severe
than the maximum should be given, defendant should be allowed to
withdraw the plea.10 The same is true where such belief is induced
by the prosecuting attorney." Where, however, no sufficient grounds
for such a belief exists the court properly may deny its permission
for withdrawal.' 2 To make an act of the court in refusing leave to
withdraw a plea of guilty an abuse of discretion it must appear that
the plea was entered under some mistake, compulsion, or inducement
working injustice. 13 Such not appearing, defendant's motion was
properly denied.
J. I. G.

MORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGENT.-Plaintiff obtained judg-

ment of foreclosure and sale just prior to the effective date of
§1083-a' of the Civil Practice Act. Sale of premises under this
judgment was effected subsequent to the date this section became
operative. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should have reasonable
value of property ascertained before a deficiency judgment is granted.
Plaintiff contends that that section does not apply herein. Held,
judgment of foreclosure and sale is final and the statute, having no
retroactive effect, does not apply to the case at bar. Feiber Realty
Corp., et al. v. Abel, 265 N. Y. 94, 191 N. E. 847 (1934).
A judgment of foreclosure and sale has been held to be final
and an adjudication of all questions at issue.2 Therefore, judgment
8

Krolage v. People, 224 Ill. 456, 79 N. E. 570 (1906) ; State v. Cimini, 53

Wash. 268, 101 Pac. 891 (1909).

"People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 45 Pac. 986 (1896); Jenkins v. State, 6
Okla. Cr. 516, 120 Pac. 298 (1912); McDaril v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 740, 120
Pac. 299 (1912).
. State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 (1880); State v. Kring, 71 Mo. 551
(1880).

'Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 77 S. E. 1080 (1913); People v.
Walker, 250 Ill. 427, 95 N. E. 475 (1911); Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18

N. E. 42 (1888).

' State v. Yates, 52 Kan. 566, 35 Pac. 209 (1894) ; State v. Pyle, 52 Kan.
569, 35 Pac. 210 (1894) ; State v. Pottenger, 52 Kan. 569, 35 Pac. 210 (1894).
'Mastronada v. State, 60 Miss. 86 (1882) ; State v. Cimini, supra note 8;
State v. Stephenson, supra note 6.
1 August 28th, 1933.
' Morris v. Morange, 38 N. Y. 172 (1868); Bolles v. Duff, 43 N. Y. 473
(1871); Cambridge Valley Nat'l Bank v. Lynch, 76 N. Y. 516 (1879); Wadsworth v. Lyon, et al., 93 N. Y. 218 (1883); Wager v. Link, 134 N. Y. 122,
31 N. E. 213 (1892) ; Read v. Patterson, et al., 134 N. Y. 128, 31 N. E. 445
(1892).

